

Women Journalists Without Chains

Taiz Under Siege and Fire

Civilian Harm and Human Rights Violations Attributed to the Houthi Militia

Reporting period: September 1–October 14, 2026

Women Journalists Without Chains (WJWC)

October 2026

Executive summary

Between 1 September and 14 October 2026, Women Journalists Without Chains (WJWC) documented at least 35 people killed and 90 injured within the administrative boundaries of Taiz governorate in incidents attributed to the Houthi militia. Those killed included eight children and six adult women; those injured included 12 children and 10 adult women. A woman eight months pregnant was killed by mortar fire in al-Shaqab, and her unborn child died with her.

The toll is not limited to the effects of hostilities. Alongside deaths from shelling and sniper fire, it includes people killed inside their homes, people killed after being taken away by armed men, and reported summary

executions. A further five people were killed and at least nine injured on two roads in Lahj governorate that carry people and supplies to Taiz; these are recorded separately and are not included in the governorate totals.

Shelling damaged at least 12 homes, three health facilities, a school, university buildings under construction, a judicial complex and places of worship. The United Nations reported that Houthi fighters seized eight UN vehicles from its humanitarian hub in al-Mokha. Twelve private vehicles were damaged, and an ambulance carrying two bodies was held on the al-Mokha–al-Kadaha road.

As the Houthi militia extended its control over western and southern districts, local sources reported the detention of hundreds of residents at new checkpoints and during raids on villages. Names could not be compiled. Those taken to undisclosed locations include the journalist Sadiq Shalli, detained at his home in al-Mokha on 10 September. Families were threatened with the demolition of their homes, women's phones were searched to pressure their relatives, and Starlink terminals were confiscated.

Road closures and tightened siege conditions cut supplies of food, fuel, water and medicine. By 14 October, the World Food Programme (WFP) said it could not reach more than 600,000 people in Taiz who depend on aid, among them more than 200,000 women and children. By 6 October, 114,708 displaced people were registered inside the governorate, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

This conduct raises serious concerns under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II, and customary international humanitarian law. The concerns include the prohibitions on murder, indiscriminate attacks, pillage, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, collective punishment, attacks on medical care and the recruitment of children. Several incidents warrant criminal investigation as possible war crimes.

The most urgent measures are these: the Houthi militia must stop attacks on civilians and civilian objects, lift restrictions on movement and humanitarian access, and disclose the whereabouts of everyone it holds, including Sadiq Shalli. It must also return seized medical and humanitarian

assets. The killings documented here require independent investigation and prosecution of those responsible, including commanders.

Methodology and limitations

This report covers violations attributed to the Houthi militia in Taiz governorate between 1 September and 14 October 2026. It draws on information gathered by the WJWC monitoring unit and its field monitors, chiefly accounts from local residents, a medical source and local and official sources. It also uses published data from the United Nations, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix, the Executive Unit for IDP Camps Management, the Yemeni Ministry of Health, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, WFP and an economic bulletin (see Annex B).

The report distinguishes between three kinds of information:

- incidents reported directly to WJWC by residents, relatives or a medical source, identified as such in the text;
- incidents reported by local sources and not independently corroborated, described as "reported";
- figures and statements published by UN agencies, government bodies and other organizations, attributed to them by name.

Casualty counting. The totals cover people killed or injured within Taiz governorate's administrative boundaries. Deaths include those caused by shelling and sniper fire, killings inside homes or after abduction, and reported summary executions. Casualties on roads in Lahj governorate are recorded separately.

Access constraints. Field monitors faced serious obstacles to moving and working in areas recently taken by the Houthi militia, which prohibits independent human rights organizations from operating in areas under its control. Continued fighting and the militia's tightening hold on Taiz city and its access roads further limited safe access to victims, witnesses and affected areas. The figures in this report therefore represent a minimum documented toll, not a complete account.

Detention data. Monitors could not obtain the names of most people detained. Reporting was limited because families relied on local mediation to secure releases, and because events and fighting remained fluid.



Context and geographic scope

During the reporting period, the Houthi militia expanded its control along the Taiz coast and in the western and southern rural districts, while fighting continued on most fronts in the governorate. It took control of al-Mokha city on 10 September. In early October, the escalation reached al-Shamayatayn and other southern areas, cutting Taiz city's main southern link to Aden. The militia also tightened the siege it already imposes on Taiz city.

The incidents documented here occurred in:

- **Taiz city, including Usaifira, Wadi al-Qadhi, Sala, al-Shamasi, al-Dhahra, Bir Basha and the area around al-Thawra Hospital;**
- **rural districts: Jabal Habashi, Maqbana, Sabir al-Mawadim, al-Misrakh, Sama', al-Mawasit, al-Shamayatayn and al-Ma'afir;**
- **the coast and the west: al-Wazi'iya, al-Mokha, Dhubab and Bab al-**

Mandab.

Residential communities along the roads linking the city, its countryside and the coast were affected. Fighting made it harder for residents to move, for the injured to be evacuated and for basic goods to reach markets.

The effects of the fighting reached into daily life. Some victims were hit inside or near their homes. Shelling struck tents sheltering displaced families, hospitals, schools and checkpoints used by travellers. Homes and their surroundings were used for military purposes. Families were threatened, searched and pressured because of their relatives' affiliations or because they refused to hand their homes to fighters.

Documented violations

1. Killings and injuries from shelling and sniper fire

Shelling and sniper fire killed and injured civilians in their homes, in neighbourhoods, at a restaurant, at a checkpoint used by travellers and in a tent sheltering a displaced family. Children were among the victims in most incidents. Unless stated otherwise, the incidents below are attributed to the Houthi militia by the source.

Incidents Documented in September 2026

- 1 September, Usaifira (north Taiz city). Hamdi Burhan Abdullah, 10, was wounded by shell fragments during shelling of the 7 July neighbourhood.
- 4 September, Mafraq al-Mokha. A rocket struck a restaurant, killing three people, injuring 17 and damaging property, according to local and official sources. The source does not state who fired the rocket.
- 5 September, al-Rahba and al-Kadaha. Sniper fire attributed to the Houthi militia wounded Mahfouz Mahfouz Salem Abdulrazzaq, 7; his brother Nunan, 13; and Safa Mahfouz Salem Abdulrazzaq, 30. Turki Hazza Ahmed Hizam, 8, was hit in the jaw by a fragment; the source does not state where.
- 12 September, al-Shaqab, Sabir al-Mawadim (south-east of the city). Maliya Abduljalil Muhaib Ali, 31, was killed when a mortar shell struck the area. She was eight months pregnant, and her unborn child also died. Residents said Houthi fighters positioned at Naqil al-Hadd fired three

mortar shells at homes. A medical source told WJWC that fragments struck her abdomen and back and that part of the foetus was expelled.

- 24 September, Wadi al-Qadhi (Taiz city). Amir Issam Ahmed Naji Ghaleb, 3, was killed by a shell that fell in the al-Shafi'i Mosque neighbourhood. Five people were injured: Hani Ahmed Ali, 43; Amjad Mohammed Sharaf, 12; Mohammed Ali al-Nabhi; Abdulmalik Marwan; and Mohammed Farouq Mohammed, 18. Their injuries were to the head, neck, shoulder, back and limbs. Hani Ahmed Ali was in critical condition when the case was reported to WJWC.
- 25 September, al-Zariba village, al-Sharaja, Jabal Habashi. Elias Nabil al-Barakani, a child, was hit in the abdomen by fragments during shelling attributed to the Houthi militia. He died of his injuries on 27 September.
- 28 September, Hasi Saif area, al-Ahyouq subdistrict, al-Wazi'iya District. A mortar shell struck the tent of Abdullatif Ali Abdo Saad al-Haiqi, killing his wife and injuring his son. The family had pitched the tent after being displaced again as the militia advanced.
- 29 September, Jabal Jarad. Artillery fire on villages reportedly killed one civilian, injured others and damaged homes and property.
- 30 September, Sala (east Taiz city). Youssef Abdulwarith Karami, 15, was killed by a head wound during shelling of a residential area. Awatef Abdullah, 29, was injured in the same attack.

The girl killed when Houthi gunfire struck a vehicle carrying civilians fleeing Jabal Habashi, west of Taiz, on 9 October 2026. Her sister was injured in the attack.

Incidents Documented from 1 to 14 October 2026

- **2 October, several areas. The local toll for the day recorded five people killed: Mohammed Muhaib Saeed, Amani Yassin, Jawas Abdullah Noman, Ayoub Abdulraqib and Hamoud Abdullah Saif al-Rajhi. Another 21 were injured in al-Dhabab, Wadi al-Qadhi, Jabal Habashi, al-Shamayatayn, Sama' and parts of the city. The day's victims included people hit by shelling and sniper fire and one man killed inside his home (see section 2).**
- **5 October, al-Hunjur checkpoint (western entrance to the city). A shell killed Abduljabbar Hayel Saeed, 21, and injured six travellers on a route residents use to enter and leave the city.**
- **6 October, al-Sarm, al-Misrakh. Shelling struck the home of Dirham Ahmed Amir, killing him, his wife Ruqayya Ali Abdulrab Ali and their granddaughter Aisha Imad Dirham Ahmed Amir. Luna Mujib Mahmoud Saif was among the injured.**
- **6 October, Bani Yusuf, al-Mawasit. Shelling of al-Dawm, Hajra and al-Manawid villages reportedly killed one person and injured four.**
- **6 October, al-Wazi'iya. Shelling of the home of Mohammed Saif al-Alqami reportedly killed his wife and injured others.**
- **7 October, Taiz city. Five civilians were injured when shelling hit homes and residential areas around al-Thawra Hospital and in al-Shamasi.**
- **8 October, Nimra subdistrict, Jabal Habashi. Sniper fire attributed to the Houthi militia killed Nesma Mohammed Ghaleb, 4, and injured her sister Basma, 7, and their mother.**
- **9 October, al-Shaqab, Sabir al-Mawadim. Houthi shelling killed Mohammed Abdullah Abdo Muqbil and Dhikrayat Abdulwahid Ahmed Yahya and injured at least four others. The villages of al-Shaqab were shelled again the next day, after repeated attacks on the area in September.**
- **11 October, Taiz city and countryside. During an escalation by the**

militia, at least six people were reportedly killed and 18 injured. Ahlam Abdulsalam, 5, was killed inside her home in Hisban, al-Misrakh. Children and women were reported injured in residential neighbourhoods of the city, and al-Safwa Hospital and its surroundings were damaged.

- **12 October, Taiz city. Five injured people were named: Sulaiman Hani Ali, 4; Adham Hani Ali, 12; Alaa Imad Ali Hamid, 6; Hadaya Sulaiman Hassan, 30; and Rahma Amin Mohammed, 30. Four members of one family were injured in al-Dhahra and a woman was injured in Bir Basha. It is unclear whether these overlap with the five named victims or are included in the October total.**

In several incidents, more than one member of the same family was killed or injured. The death of Dirham Ahmed Amir with his wife and granddaughter, and the injuries to the Abdulrazzaq siblings and to four members of one family in al-Dhahra, show the harm reaching inside homes.

A civilian executed in Jabal Habashi after refusing to allow the Houthi militia to use his home, according to local residents.

2. Killings inside homes and after abduction

Four people were killed by Houthi fighters inside or at their homes or after being seized, and three more were reportedly executed in the field. These

deaths did not result from shelling or crossfire: in each case, the victim was within reach of armed men.

- 5 September, Maqbana. Local residents told WJWC that Houthi fighters killed Taha Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah, a soldier, inside his home in front of his wife and children. He had a disability caused by a landmine injury several years earlier.
- 2 October, al-Salaf, Sama'. Hamoud Abdullah Saif al-Rajhi was killed inside his home. Local residents told WJWC that he was killed after refusing to let Houthi snipers use his house as a firing position.
- 7 October, Hayjat Tha'uba, al-Za'azi' subdistrict, al-Shamayatayn. Armed men raided the farm of Fawzi Shamsan Ahmed Thabet al-Za'za'i, 52, a former school principal. According to the information received, he was beaten, his belongings were taken, and he was led away and then shot dead.
- 7 October, Ra'san, rural Taiz. Information received on this date accused Houthi fighters of the field execution of Ibrahim al-Khadashi, Shawqi Muhaib and Adnan Saeed Rashed. The circumstances of their deaths are not described.
- 8 October, al-Mahsha' village, Jabal Habashi. Abdulkarim Qasem Hassan al-Buraihi, a teacher, was reportedly killed by Houthi fighters at his home.

The circumstances of these deaths require investigation into everyone involved: those who detained, assaulted and killed the victims, and those who gave orders or commanded the units responsible.

A person's political or professional affiliation, or ties to a party to the conflict, never justifies killing that person or attacking their family. Anyone in the power of a party to the conflict is protected from murder and ill-treatment. That protection covers the wounded, detainees, and those who have laid down their arms or can no longer fight.

Interior damage to a civilian home caused by shelling of a residential area.

3. Shelling of residential areas and civilian objects

Throughout the reporting period, shelling struck populated neighbourhoods, villages, roads and public buildings. Reports describe the use of rockets, artillery, mortars and heavy and medium weapons in areas where civilians live or where displaced families shelter, with some communities hit repeatedly within days.

Schools, university and judicial buildings

- **Between 3 and 5 September, al-Suwaida, al-Wazi'iya. A rocket struck Karim School while students were present, damaging the building.**
- **Dawn, 6 September, western Taiz city. Three ballistic missiles fell near the Social Welfare facility, the Faculty of Medicine and the Central Prison, damaging Faculty of Medicine buildings under construction.**
- **8 September, Jabal Jarra. Shelling reached the judicial complex and its surroundings, and residential areas in the Air Defence area of the city.**
- **13 September, Duba' al-Dakhil, al-Shamayatayn. A projectile fell near a primary school during shelling of the area's villages.**

Villages and neighbourhoods

Date	Location	Reported shelling and damage
6 Sep	Bani Bukari and al-Sharaja villages	Shells; injuries and damage to homes reported
6 Sep	Kilaba, Usaifira, Jabal Jarra	Fire from a combat vehicle and artillery
6 Sep	al-Shaqab villages	Mortars and rockets
7 Sep	al-Kuraifat and eastern neighbourhoods	Shelling
13 Sep	al-Qasr crossing area and east of the city	Heavy and medium weapons
20 Sep	Ra'san villages, al-Shamayatayn	Shelling after armed clashes
27 Sep	al-Dhabab villages	More than six shells fired from Houthi positions in al-Rubai'i
28–29 Sep	al-Shaqab villages	Ten mortar shells on 28 Sep; shelling renewed the next day
Late Sep	Bani Bukari villages	Tank and mortar fire; three homes partly damaged
30 Sep (evening)	al-Dhabab, al-Siyahi, Hadhran, Milat	23 shells within hours
1 Oct	Communities and sites hosting displaced people in al-Shamayatayn, Jabal Habashi, al-Misrakh, Sama'	Shelling
2 Oct	al-Khara'ib, Sama'	Shelling of populated areas
3 Oct	Villages of Shari' subdistrict	Shelling
5 Oct	al-Arma and al-Buraiha, Jabal Habashi	Shelling
8 Oct	al-Adaf, al-Arma, al-Shariq	Attacks and shelling

12 Oct (evening)	Taiz city	Intense shelling across neighbourhoods

Damage reported during the October escalation included seven homes, 12 vehicles, al-Safwa Hospital and al-Saeed Mosque. Repeated shelling of neighbourhoods puts residents at risk whether they stay at home or go out for treatment and daily needs.

4. Detention, raids and pressure on families

According to local sources, the Houthi militia detained hundreds of residents in the districts it took in western and southern Taiz. It set up checkpoints where travellers were seized according to the type of identity card they carried, and looted the homes and vehicles of civilians with no connection to the fighting. Those detained during the takeover of villages and rural subdistricts reportedly include residents who opposed the militia's presence, former government employees, security personnel who had not taken part in the fighting, and local bloggers who had criticized the militia.

WJWC monitors could not compile the names of those detained. Few violations were reported, many families relied on local mediation to secure the release of relatives, and events remained fluid. There is a real risk of a broad campaign of reprisals carried out away from media attention and in areas where independent civil society organizations are banned.

The monitoring unit documented the following incidents.

Checkpoints and arrests

- **5–6 September, Jabal Habashi and Maqbana. Checkpoints were reportedly set up and people holding military identity cards detained, while homes were raided and personal belongings confiscated. Near al-Kadaha, detainees were reportedly required to chant the militia's slogan as a condition of release. On 6 September, people were detained on the al-Mokha–al-Kadaha road while it was open for a few hours.**
- **Early October, al-Madh'aba and Waq'an, Sama'. Mohammed Ahmed Abdo and Hazza Abdullah Naji were reportedly arrested and their place of detention was not disclosed.**

- 7 October, al-Ma'afir. Armed men stormed the home of Ahmed Hazza al-Sanawi, Director General of al-Ma'afir district, and took him to an undisclosed location. The same day, the wounded man Abdulsalam Bajash and unnamed companions were reportedly detained; their fate has not been disclosed.

Detention of a journalist

On 10 September, the journalist Sadiq Shalli, director of the National Resistance Media Centre, was taken from his home in al-Mokha to an undisclosed location. The Houthi militia must disclose where he is held and the grounds for his detention, allow him contact with his family and a lawyer, and guarantee his safety.

Raids, threats and searches

- 1 October, al-Salaf, Sama'. Raids accompanied the arrests.
- 3 October, al-Shamayatayn and Jabal Habashi. Homes were searched and women and children intimidated.
- 6 October, Anaqib and al-Maqatin, Jabal Habashi. Families were reportedly threatened with the demolition of their homes, and women's phones were searched to pressure their relatives.
- 7 October. Raids extended to Kuhah, al-Mish'ar and Dhi al-Shahran in Jabal Habashi, and to the homes of three military commanders in al-Ashrouh (Qadas), Bani Hammad and al-Mukaisha (Qadas).
- 8 October, western countryside. Women members of the militia, known as the Zainabiyat, reportedly took part in searching homes and phones.

Communications

Starlink terminals were reportedly confiscated in al-Turba and al-Mokha. Residents also complained of YemenNet outages in parts of the governorate; the source does not attribute these outages to any party.

Threatening and pressuring people because of their family ties harms relatives for acts they did not commit. Arbitrary searches of phones and correspondence violate privacy and deepen fear of reprisal, and the confiscation of satellite internet equipment restricts residents' ability to communicate and to report what is happening. Every detainee must be

registered, their family informed of where they are held, and they must receive medical care. No detainee may be ill-treated or used to pressure others.

A civilian vehicle damaged during an attack on a public road.

5. Demolition, looting and military use of homes

Looting

In September, WJWC received reports of equipment, documents and other assets being looted from al-Mokha port and airport, and of homes and facilities being raided and property and vehicles taken. Residents described household belongings disappearing in al-Mokha after owners left, including from the home of Omar Dabla and from the home of a widow supporting three children.

Demolition of homes

On 7 October, the home of Ibrahim Ahmed al-Maqrami in al-Maqarima, al-Shamayatayn, was reportedly blown up, the day after he was killed in the fighting. A family home and the harm its destruction causes to the family are protected regardless of the owner's role in the fighting. Another home

was reportedly blown up the same day in a subdistrict of al-Hujariya.

Military use of homes

Hamoud al-Rajhi was killed after refusing to let snipers use his home (section 2). In early October, a weapon was placed in the courtyard of a house, and Houthi fighters took up positions inside homes in al-Tarira, al-Wazi'iya. Such practices expose residents to clashes and strikes and leave them choosing between staying in their homes and fleeing under unsafe conditions.

Places of worship and religious coercion

In September and October, the militia reportedly imposed preachers of its choosing on mosques in the coastal districts. In October, it reportedly did the same in the districts and villages it had taken in rural Taiz. According to the source, most of these preachers and imams follow a different religious school from that of the local population. Shelling in October also damaged al-Saeed Mosque. Places of worship must be respected, freedom of religion and belief protected, and armed control must not be used to force political or religious positions on residents.

Interior damage to a civilian property in an area where homes were reportedly destroyed, looted, or used for military purposes.

6. Healthcare, ambulances and humanitarian operations

Health facilities were shelled and looted, medical equipment was removed, an ambulance was held and the wounded were prevented from leaving for

treatment. Humanitarian premises, vehicles and staff were also targeted.

Health facilities

- 7 September (evening), al-Mokha. A rocket fell near 2 December Hospital.
- After 10 September, al-Mokha. WJWC received reports that the militia moved medical equipment from 2 December Hospital to Sanaa after taking the city, although nearby districts urgently need the equipment to treat patients.
- 20 September, Harraz, Jabal Habashi. Residents said Houthi fighters entered the health unit and took medicines, equipment and supplies, reducing its ability to serve the people who depend on it.
- 29 September (evening), al-Turba. Rocket fire damaged the Maternity and Childhood Hospital, under construction to expand care for women and children.
- 13 October (dawn), central Taiz city. Shelling hit the area around al-Safwa Hospital, damaging patient rooms and windows and frightening patients and staff. A civilian was reportedly injured nearby while paramedics were present.

Ambulances and the wounded

On 6 September, the militia held an ambulance carrying the bodies of two soldiers from al-Mokha to Taiz on the al-Mokha–al-Kadaha road. On 6 October, WJWC was informed that residents of villages in Qadas were prevented from leaving and that some wounded people were prevented from being taken for treatment. Such restrictions endanger the lives of the wounded and deny families the ability to bury their dead with dignity.

Humanitarian operations

On 10 September, the United Nations said Houthi fighters had entered the humanitarian hub in al-Mokha and seized eight UN vehicles. Accounts received on 16 September described fighters entering aid offices and warehouses in the coastal areas of Taiz, pursuing humanitarian workers, and searching staff homes and taking belongings.

Attacks on relief assets, warehouses and staff harm everyone who depends on aid. Seized assets and equipment must be returned, interference in

humanitarian work must end, and medical and relief teams must be able to reach people in need safely and without discrimination.

7. Landmines and improvised explosive devices

Explosive devices disguised as stones or concealed in concrete blocks were found or reported on routes used by civilians.

- 24 September, Mudhafa, Bani Bukari. Three explosive devices disguised as rocks were found and dismantled. Local information attributed their placement to the Houthi militia.
- 5 October. Devices disguised as rocks were reportedly transported to al-Turba.
- 8–9 October, Dhubab and Bab al-Mandab. Landmines and explosive devices were reported on roads, including explosives hidden inside concrete blocks.

According to the source, these camouflage methods are commonly used by the Houthi militia against government forces on most front lines. Disguised devices are hard for residents to recognize, especially children, travellers and people returning home. They also block ambulances and supplies and can make a road or a home unusable long after fighting subsides. Planting devices that endanger civilians must stop; contaminated areas must be identified and marked, and information shared with clearance teams. The source does not state whether the devices were victim-activated, which is relevant to their legal assessment.

Children in an area affected by landmines and improvised explosive devices.

8. Displacement

Military operations, shifting front lines, shelling and road closures forced thousands of families from their homes. Many had already been displaced in earlier years of the war and were uprooted again.

Reports received by WJWC

In September, as Houthi control expanded along the Taiz coast and neighbouring districts, WJWC received reports of hundreds of families fleeing al-Mokha, Dhubab, Maqbana, Mawza', al-Wazi'iya and Jabal Habashi. They headed for Taiz city, Ras al-Ara, Aden, Lahj, and as far as Abyan and Marib. In early October, families fled villages in Sama', al-Shamayatayn, al-Mawasit and Jabal Habashi, including Shari' subdistrict, after shelling and the arrival of Houthi fighters. In al-Tarira, al-Wazi'iya, residents who could not flee remained amid the fighting with fighters positioned in nearby homes. The killing of a woman and injury of her son in a tent in al-Wazi'iya (section 1) shows that reaching a displacement site did not bring safety. On 6 October, villages in Qadas were reportedly besieged and residents prevented from leaving.

Reports from villages affected by the militia's advance describe dozens of long-settled families leaving behind homes, farmland, property, livestock and livelihoods, for fear of the fighting, of possible reprisals, or of living under the militia's authority. The available data do not show what share of the displaced these families represent or the value of what they left behind. Independent field documentation of the causes of displacement and related losses is needed.

Registered displacement

According to IOM data published on 7 October, 114,708 displaced people were registered inside Taiz governorate as of 6 October. They form part of 200,161 people displaced since early August by the escalation on the west coast across the affected governorates. The Taiz figure counts people registered inside the governorate, including arrivals from elsewhere; it is not a count of people displaced from Taiz. As of the same date, 42,264

displaced people were registered in Lahj and 20,814 in Aden; not all of them came from Taiz.

Displacement from areas of origin

“Areas of origin” are the places families lived before being forced to move: either their original homes or places where they settled after an earlier displacement. The figures therefore include first-time and repeat displacement, and do not mean that everyone leaving a district was originally from it.

Period	District of origin	Households	Source
4–10 Oct	Taiz governorate, total	3,998 (about 23,988 people)	IOM
4–10 Oct	al-Ma’afir	1,459	IOM
4–10 Oct	al-Shamayatayn	1,040	IOM
4–10 Oct	Jabal Habashi	944	IOM
27 Sep–3 Oct	al-Wazi’iya	1,049	IOM
27 Sep–3 Oct	Jabal Habashi	901	IOM
27 Sep–3 Oct	al-Shamayatayn	801	IOM
3–13 Sep	Jabal Habashi	2,381	Executive Unit
3–13 Sep	al-Ma’afir	1,803	Executive Unit
3–13 Sep	Maqbana	1,466	Executive Unit
3–13 Sep	Mawza’	748	Executive Unit
To mid-Sep	al-Wazi’iya	about 1,000	Not stated
To mid-Sep	al-Mokha	225	Not stated

In the week of 4–10 October, al-Ma’afir, al-Shamayatayn and Jabal Habashi together accounted for 3,443 households, about 86 per cent of the displacement recorded in the governorate. IOM’s person estimate assumes an average of six people per household. Figures from different periods and sources should not be added together, since some families are recorded more than once.

In September, displacement from Maqbana came mainly from villages near

the front lines. In Jabal Habashi, it was concentrated in al-Sharaja, Bani Bukari, al-Maratiba and nearby areas. In al-Ma'afir, families fled the western and north-western areas, chiefly al-Kadaha and areas bordering Maqbana and Mawza'. In Mawza', families left their homes and earlier shelter sites as fighting intensified.

On the west coast, displacement spread to al-Mokha and Dhubab (Bab al-Mandab) as fighting escalated and control changed hands. Field information indicates that more families left al-Mokha than the initial figures show. Families from Dhubab moved towards Ras al-Ara in Lahj and to Aden, facing difficult travel, higher transport costs and security fears. No independent, final figure for displacement from these two districts over the whole reporting period is available.

Movement within the governorate

Al-Shamayatayn, which had received displaced families from al-Wazi'iya and the western countryside, became a major area of displacement itself when the escalation reached it in early October. IOM recorded 3,325 households arriving in or moving to locations within Taiz governorate during 4–10 October, chiefly in al-Ma'afir (1,439), Jabal Habashi (652) and al-Shamayatayn (626). The same districts appear as both origin and destination because many families moved between villages within one district. Departure and arrival figures must not be added together, since the same household may appear in both.

Al-Misrakh, al-Mawasit, al-Mudhaffar, al-Qahira and Sala also received families fleeing the fighting, straining water, health, housing and food services, especially in Taiz city, already under road and supply restrictions. Families also moved to Lahj, Aden and Abyan, particularly from the coastal and western rural areas.

Protection concerns

Displacement threatens more than temporary shelter: it can cut families off from their land, property, livelihoods and social networks, interrupt children's education and limit access to health care. Insecure roads have made movement and aid delivery harder, especially for women, children,

older people, people with disabilities and the sick. Families displaced more than once, or without the means to leave conflict areas, face the greatest risk. Women-headed households carry a heavy burden, among them the widow in al-Mokha who lost her household belongings and supports three children. Restrictions on leaving trap families in combat zones without a safe route to protection.

Recorded figures understate actual movement. Fighting and security restrictions near front lines and in Houthi-held areas limit monitors' and aid workers' access. Many families stay with relatives or move between villages within a district, and those who remained at home or fled to remote rural areas away from organized sites are hard to reach. As of 15 October, no single consolidated figure existed for everyone displaced from Taiz governorate during the reporting period. The figures above are documented indicators of the scale of the crisis, not a comprehensive count.

These events raise serious concerns under international humanitarian law. These include the protection of civilians from direct and indiscriminate attacks; the prohibition on ordering the displacement of civilians for reasons related to the conflict, unless their security or imperative military reasons so demand; and the safety of those fleeing and unimpeded humanitarian access. Independent investigation is needed to establish responsibility for violations that displaced civilians or exposed them to serious risk. It should distinguish between flight from hostilities and displacement caused by coercive measures.

Responders should protect civilians and secure displacement and supply routes; provide shelter, food and health care; protect the property of displaced people; and safeguard their right to voluntary, safe and dignified return when conditions allow. Monitoring should be expanded to cover displaced people outside camps and in hard-to-reach areas, and should distinguish between those leaving their original homes and those displaced repeatedly.

A mother and her daughter affected by movement restrictions and the challenges of accessing essential services in Taiz.

9. Dangerous roads and restrictions on movement and supply

The spread of fighting disrupted the road network linking Taiz city with its countryside and neighbouring governorates. The al-Mokha–al-Kadaha–al-Bairain axis, the al-Dhabab–al-Bairain–al-Turba axis and the eastern crossing towards al-Hawban were closed, shelled or disrupted. Connections between the city and parts of al-Ma'afir, Jabal Habashi, al-Shamayatayn, al-Mawasit, Sama' and al-Wazi'iya were cut or weakened, restricting access to work, education and treatment and the movement of food, fuel and aid.

Loss of the main routes

When the al-Mokha road through al-Kadaha was cut in the first week of September, the city lost an important route for cooking gas, food and travellers. Fighting also reached secondary routes through Bani Omar, al-Wazi'iya and Ra'san. Transport companies suspended large buses and switched to smaller vehicles on mountain roads. Distances, costs and the dangers of steep slopes and flash floods increased, making the alternatives

unsuitable for heavy freight and for moving patients and older people.

On the eastern side, the al-Qasr crossing closed repeatedly before the government side announced its closure in early October, citing security concerns linked to clashes and Houthi movements. Developments on 4 October on the southern axis near al-Turba cut the main road to Aden while the al-Mokha road was also closed. Residents were pushed back onto long detours, and some families were cut off from relatives, work, schools and treatment on the other side of the city.

Attacks on travellers and evacuations

Date	Location	Incident	Killed	Injured
5 Sep	Hayjat al-Abd road, via al-Maqatira (Lahj)	Shelling attributed to the Houthi militia	4	9
6 Sep	al-Mokha–al-Kadaha road	Civilians detained and an ambulance carrying two bodies held while the road was open for a few hours	–	–
7 Sep	al-Ghail, north al-Wazi'iya	Shelling of civilian cars evacuating displaced people	–	Several
1 Oct	Najd al-Bard, below Hayjat al-Abd	Houthi fighters reportedly blew up a culvert, halting traffic; a man trying to stop the demolition was killed and others injured	1	Unknown
5 Oct	al-Hunjur checkpoint, western entrance to the city	Shelling attributed to the Houthi militia; Abduljabbar Hayel Saeed, 21, killed	1	6

The Lahj incidents of 5 September and 1 October account for the five deaths on roads outside the governorate cited in the executive summary.

Access to treatment

On 6 October, local information indicated that residents and wounded people were prevented from leaving villages in Qadas for treatment. The closure of the eastern crossing also harmed patients who need regular treatment, including people with kidney failure. Longer, costlier journeys make continued treatment harder, while restrictions on leaving trap families in combat zones.

Markets and water

Economic data published on 12 October showed shortages of fuel and cooking gas and declining availability of flour. Wheat and flour stocks covered about 19 days of estimated consumption in the government-held districts of the governorate. The local water corporation lost its monthly supply of 65,000 litres of diesel, about 72 per cent of its operating needs, threatening water pumping and pushing families towards costlier alternatives.

Protecting roads, travellers and supplies is tied to the rights to life, health, food, water and freedom of movement. Military operations must respect the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Starving civilians as a method of warfare and arbitrarily impeding humanitarian relief are prohibited.

Civilians queue for food assistance as the siege continues to affect access to basic necessities in Taiz.

10. Siege conditions and essential services

The Houthi militia tightened its siege of Taiz city during the reporting period. Its attacks spread and supply routes were disrupted in September, and the city's links to the south narrowed in the first week of October. Clashes and the closure of crossings for security reasons deepened the city's isolation and reduced the flow of food, fuel and medicine. The effects reached rural communities that depend on the city for treatment, trade and services, and displaced families sheltering in areas with few resources.

Food

Residents' accounts in October described difficulty obtaining flour, sugar, vegetables and cooking gas, and goods priced beyond many families' reach. One mother of four could not afford flour or sugar. Residents complained of rising prices and delayed salaries. Fuel shortages hit transport workers and motorcycle drivers, cutting their income as their families' costs rose.

By 14 October, WFP said it could not reach more than 600,000 people in Taiz who depend on humanitarian assistance, including more than 200,000 women and children, because of fighting, road closures and shifting front lines. This deepened the vulnerability of families who had lost property or income. In displacement sites in Jabal Habashi, residents described limited access to clean water and health care.



Access to water remains a critical challenge for residents as the prolonged siege continues to strain basic services in Taiz.

Water and sanitation

The diesel shortage threatened water pumps and made water deliveries by tanker harder and more expensive. Families found it harder to obtain safe water and maintain hygiene, especially in crowded displacement sites. Shortages of cooking gas pushed some residents to burn firewood and cardboard to cook.

Health

Health data for September recorded difficulty reaching Taiz city and al-Turba and disruption to referrals and supplies. On 10 October, health authorities warned that medicines, intravenous fluids, medical supplies and fuel were close to running out. They called for oxygen supplies and warned that emergency, surgical, intensive care, dialysis and neonatal incubator services could stop. Generators, ambulances and cold chains for medicines and vaccines were at risk, exposing patients, the wounded, pregnant women and newborns to preventable complications and deaths.

In rural areas, the siege combined with shelling and restrictions on movement, as in Qadas (section 9). Disrupted links between the districts and the city harmed patients needing regular treatment and follow-up. Rising numbers of wounded strained beds and capacity for other patients and increased families' costs for treatment and travel.

Education

Classes were suspended in schools and colleges in the city. On 8 October, the emergency committee suspended classes and granted staff temporary leave in districts that had come under Houthi control, citing security conditions. Fear of shelling, combined with the daily search for food and fuel, strained families and disrupted children's routines.

These conditions affect the rights to life, health, food, water, education and an adequate standard of living. Starving civilians or depriving them of supplies essential to their survival as a means of subduing an adversary

is prohibited. Impartial humanitarian relief must be allowed and facilitated, and patients and health workers protected.

11. Child recruitment, exploitation of vulnerable groups and the recovery of the dead

Recruitment of children and of refugees and migrants

WJWC received reports that the Houthi militia recruited children and used African refugees and migrants in the fighting in Taiz. Reports from front lines in the governorate covering 3–15 September described members of these groups being lured or forced into the militia's ranks and sent to Taiz fronts. This exposes people who need protection to death, injury, capture and loss of contact with their families.

Recruitment was not limited to children living in Taiz. On 7 September, WJWC received a report that children from Dhamar, Amran and Saada governorates were recruited with cash incentives and food assistance for their families and sent to Taiz fronts, some without prior military training. Accounts published up to 14 October referred to children among the dead, captured and missing on fronts including Taiz. Exploiting families' need for money turns poverty into a recruitment tool and exposes children to injury, disability and psychological harm that may outlast their time in the fighting.

Pressure on marginalized workers

Mobilization also targeted groups with little social protection. On 21 September, local sources reported that sanitation workers from the Muhamasheen (marginalized) community and African migrants were being put through military courses in Houthi-held areas of Taiz. In the same month, cleaning and sanitation workers described pressure and threats to force them to join training and mobilization. These practices threaten the workers' safety and freedom, their families' income and essential public services at a time of growing public health need.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict provides that armed groups

should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under 18. Children must be released and supported to return to education, health care and psychosocial support. Children who are captured must be treated primarily as victims of recruitment, with their identity and dignity protected, and their families supported to reduce the risk of re-recruitment.

Bodies left on front lines

During the reporting period, WJWC received reports of the bodies of Houthi fighters left in valleys and ravines along the front lines west of Taiz. Continued shelling and clashes make these sites dangerous to reach. Delays in recovery and the decomposition of remains make identification and return to families harder.

Unsafe handling of remains poses health risks, as does possible contamination of drinking water if bodies or fluids reach water sources; the sight of bodies also causes psychological harm. Remains must be kept away from water sources and recovered and buried appropriately. Sites must be checked for remains and explosive remnants before they are used again for farming, grazing or passage.

Each party to the conflict, within the areas it controls, must take all feasible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the dead without discrimination whenever circumstances permit, and to respect their dignity and their families' right to know their fate. Safe arrangements and local pauses in fighting are needed so that specialist teams can work, record remains, belongings and burial sites, and return remains to families. Mutilating bodies or using them for propaganda or extortion is prohibited.

Applicable international legal framework

The fighting in Taiz is part of a non-international armed conflict between the internationally recognized government of Yemen, with forces aligned to it, and the Houthi militia. The conduct documented in this report is governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), which binds all parties, and by international human rights law.

Sources of obligation

- **Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions binds the Houthi militia as a party to the conflict. It prohibits violence to life and person, in particular murder, cruel treatment and torture; the taking of hostages; and outrages upon personal dignity against anyone not taking an active part in hostilities.**
- **Additional Protocol II (1977), to which Yemen has been a party since 1990, applies where an organized armed group exercises control over territory that enables it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. The Houthi militia's control of territory in Taiz appears to meet this threshold.**
- **Customary IHL, as identified in the ICRC's study of customary rules, binds all parties, including the rules on the conduct of hostilities.**
- **International human rights law. Yemen is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict. UN bodies increasingly hold that armed groups exercising government-like control over territory and population, as the Houthi militia does, must respect the human rights of people under their control.**
- **International criminal law. Yemen is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Statute's definitions of war crimes in non-international armed conflict are cited here as a reference for serious violations that entail individual criminal responsibility under customary law.**

These obligations apply regardless of the conduct of the opposing side or the political and military claims the militia advances.

Shelling and sniper fire

Parties must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, as are attacks expected to cause civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm. The

presence of fighters near a residential area does not suspend these rules.

The repeated use of mortars, rockets and artillery on residential neighbourhoods, villages and a displacement site raises serious concern that attacks were indiscriminate. These weapons have a wide area effect and limited accuracy in populated areas. In most incidents, however, the source does not identify the target or whether a military objective was nearby, which is needed to establish an indiscriminate or disproportionate attack. Sniper fire is different: a sniper selects a target. The shooting of young children and family members, such as Nesma Mohammed Ghaleb, 4, and the Abdulrazzaq siblings, warrants investigation as possible deliberate attacks on civilians, a war crime if intent is established.

Killings of people inside homes or in custody

Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II prohibit the murder of civilians and of anyone placed hors de combat by detention, wounds or surrender. Under human rights law, such killings are arbitrary deprivations of life. The killing of Fawzi al-Za'za'i after he was beaten, robbed and led away by armed men is the most fully described case. If confirmed, it would constitute an extrajudicial execution and the war crime of murder. The killing of Hamoud al-Rajhi after he refused to give up his home to snipers would, if confirmed, also amount to murder. The reported field executions in Ra'san and the killing of Abdulkarim al-Buraihi require further information on the circumstances. The case of Taha Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah depends on his status at the time: if his disability had ended his active service, or he was not taking part in hostilities, he was protected from attack.

Detention, enforced disappearance and pressure on families

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited under customary IHL and the ICCPR. Detaining people because of the identity card they carry, or making release conditional on chanting a political slogan, is incompatible with these rules. Detainees must be registered, allowed to contact their families and treated humanely.

Where detaining authorities refuse to acknowledge a detention or conceal the person's fate or whereabouts, the detention may amount to enforced

disappearance. Several detainees, including Sadiq Shalli, Ahmed Hazza al-Sanawi, Mohammed Ahmed Abdo, Hazza Abdullah Naji and Abdulsalam Bajash, were taken to undisclosed locations. Whether this amounts to enforced disappearance depends on whether families' inquiries were refused or went unanswered.

Journalists who are civilians must be respected and protected unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Sadiq Shalli heads the media centre of the National Resistance, a party to the conflict; his status should be assessed carefully. Whatever that status, his detention requires a lawful basis, disclosure of his whereabouts and humane treatment. The confiscation of Starlink terminals and searches of phones engage the rights to freedom of expression and privacy under Articles 19 and 17 of the ICCPR.

Collective punishment is prohibited. Threatening families with the demolition of their homes and pressuring relatives through their phones punish people for acts they did not commit.

Destruction, pillage and military use of homes

Pillage is prohibited and is a war crime. The reported looting of homes, al-Mokha port and airport, a health unit and humanitarian warehouses falls within this prohibition if confirmed. Destroying an adversary's property is a war crime unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict. Blowing up the home of a fighter after his death serves no apparent military purpose and may amount to both unlawful destruction and collective punishment. Parties must avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. Forcing residents to accept fighters or weapons in their homes exposes them to attack, and using civilians to shield military objectives is prohibited.

Medical care and humanitarian operations

Medical units and transports must be respected and protected, and the wounded and sick collected and cared for without delay. Preventing the wounded from leaving Qadas for treatment, removing equipment from 2 December Hospital and looting the Harraz health unit engage these rules.

The ambulance held on 6 September was carrying the dead rather than the wounded; the rules on medical transport and on the treatment of the dead both apply, and the circumstances should be clarified. Humanitarian personnel and objects must be respected and protected. The seizure of eight UN vehicles reported by the United Nations, and the reported pursuit of aid workers, violate this obligation.

Siege, starvation and humanitarian access

Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited, as is attacking, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to their survival. Parties must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian relief, subject to their right of control. The cumulative effect of road closures, attacks on routes and the destruction of a culvert has deprived hundreds of thousands of people of food, fuel, water and medicine. Establishing the war crime of starvation requires proof of intent. The source does not establish that intent, and not every closure is attributable to the Houthi militia: the government side announced the closure of the al-Qasr crossing. The obstruction of relief and the attacks on supply routes nevertheless require investigation.

Displacement

Ordering the displacement of civilians for reasons related to the conflict is prohibited unless their security or imperative military reasons demand it. Displaced people have the right to voluntary return in safety and to respect for their property. The displacement described in this report appears largely to result from flight from hostilities and fear of reprisals. The source does not document orders to leave, and the report does not characterize the displacement as forced; the reported prevention of residents leaving Qadas raises the opposite concern of civilians trapped in a combat zone.

Landmines and explosive devices

Parties using landmines must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects, record their placement where possible, and remove or neutralize them when hostilities end. Yemen is a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Placing devices disguised as stones on routes used by civilians

creates a serious risk of indiscriminate harm. If the devices are victim-activated, their use on civilian routes is very likely to be indiscriminate.

Children and vulnerable groups

Customary IHL prohibits recruiting children into armed groups and allowing them to take part in hostilities. Recruiting or using children under 15 to participate actively in hostilities is a war crime. The Optional Protocol sets 18 as the standard for armed groups. The reports do not give the ages of the children recruited, which determines whether the war crime threshold is met. Forcing migrants, refugees or civilian workers to train or fight engages the prohibitions on forced labour and inhumane treatment.

The dead

Parties must take all possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the dead without adverse distinction, prevent their despoliation and mutilation, dispose of them respectfully, record information to identify them and inform families. These obligations apply to fighters' bodies left on the front lines west of Taiz.

Religious freedom

The convictions and religious practices of civilians and persons deprived of liberty must be respected, and the ICCPR protects freedom of religion and belief against coercion. Imposing preachers on local mosques by force of arms engages these protections.

Accountability and responsibility

The Houthi militia bears responsibility as a party to the conflict for the violations committed by its members documented in this report. Armed control over towns and villages gives no one the right to dispose of residents' lives, liberty or property. Accountability must reach everyone who committed, ordered or contributed to these violations, up to the highest level of command the evidence supports.

Individual criminal responsibility

Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit directly

or jointly with others, order, or assist where the conditions for criminal participation are met. This includes those who make shelling, detention, transport or recruitment capabilities available to facilitate crimes, once their role and the required mental element are established. Superior orders are no defence where the subordinate knew an order was unlawful or its unlawfulness was manifest. An order to kill civilians or execute detainees does not become lawful because a commander issued it.

Command and superior responsibility

Houthi military commanders, and those who exercise command functions in practice, are responsible for their subordinates' crimes where three conditions are met: they had effective control over the subordinates; they knew, or had reason to know, of the crimes; and they failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or punish them or to refer them for investigation. A commander need not be present at the scene or have ordered the crime. What matters is the actual ability to direct and discipline fighters, including through supervisors, intermediaries or units operating under different names.

Non-military superiors, including senior political and security officials and the militia's supervisors, may also be responsible. For them, the test is whether they knew of, or consciously disregarded, information clearly indicating their subordinates' crimes, whether those crimes concerned activities within their responsibility and control, and whether they failed to take the required measures.

This report does not identify individual commanders or establish the chain of command for any incident. The repetition of similar conduct across districts and weeks, including killings of people in the militia's power, raids, threats to families and the seizure of property, nevertheless requires investigators to examine orders, reporting lines and what, if anything, was done to stop the conduct and punish those responsible. Investigations should not stop at the fighters on the ground before the role of those who directed or enabled them has been examined.

Potential international crimes

The facts set out in this report provide a serious basis for criminal investigation of possible war crimes, in particular:

- **the murder of persons in the militia's power, including Fawzi al-Za'za'i and Hamoud al-Rajhi, and the reported field executions in Ra'san;**
- **deliberate attacks on civilians, notably sniper fire on children;**
- **pillage of homes, medical facilities, port and airport assets and humanitarian property;**
- **destruction of homes not justified by military necessity;**
- **the recruitment or use of children under 15, if the ages of the children concerned are established.**

Each requires proof of all legal elements and of a nexus to the armed conflict. Those responsible should be prosecuted before competent national and international courts where jurisdiction exists, with fair-trial guarantees and protection for victims and witnesses. War crimes are not subject to statutes of limitation. Political settlements must not shield perpetrators or curtail victims' rights to truth, justice, reparation, restitution of property, compensation and rehabilitation.

Conclusions

In the six weeks covered by this report, the Houthi militia's advance in Taiz brought harm to civilians in nearly every setting where they tried to live, move or seek help. People were killed in their homes, in a tent, at a restaurant and at a checkpoint. Others were killed after armed men seized them. Hospitals, ambulances and aid convoys, which should have offered protection, were shelled, looted or held.

The harm took two forms that reinforce each other. Direct violence killed at least 35 people and injured at least 90 in the governorate. At the same time, the tightening siege, road closures and attacks on supply routes cut access to food, fuel, water and medicine for hundreds of thousands, and pushed tens of thousands into displacement. Families displaced earlier in the war were uprooted again, and some found no safety where they fled.

In areas newly under its control, the militia's conduct points to the use

of armed authority against the population: detentions at checkpoints based on identity cards, abductions to undisclosed locations, threats to demolish family homes, searches of women's phones, the confiscation of satellite internet equipment and the imposition of preachers on mosques. The detention of the journalist Sadiq Shalli and the restrictions on communications limit the ability of residents and the media to report what is happening.

The recruitment of children and the coercion of migrants and marginalized workers draw the most vulnerable into the fighting. Explosive devices disguised as stones and bodies left unrecovered on the front lines mean the danger will outlast the fighting.

These findings rest on documentation gathered under severe access constraints and represent a minimum. They are sufficient to require immediate protective measures and independent criminal investigation. The rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation remain in force regardless of the continuing war or changes of control.

Recommendations

The Houthi militia must immediately end the violations documented in this report. Its leadership is responsible for ensuring that its members comply with the rules protecting civilians.

To the Houthi militia and its military, security and political leadership

Immediate protective measures

1. Stop attacks on civilians. Issue clear, binding orders to end attacks on civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate shelling, disproportionate attacks and extrajudicial killings, and hold violators to account at every level of command.

2. Lift the siege and arbitrary restrictions on movement and supply. Open roads to civilian traffic; allow the safe passage of food, fuel, medicine and aid; and facilitate medical evacuation and voluntary departure, including from villages in Qadas. Stop using residents' needs as leverage or tying supplies to military or political gain.

3. Disclose the fate of detainees and end arbitrary detention. Disclose all places of detention and release immediately everyone held without legal basis, including the journalist Sadiq Shalli unless lawful grounds for his detention are disclosed. Guarantee judicial review, contact with families and lawyers, and medical care; allow the ICRC to visit detainees under its procedures; and end torture and ill-treatment.

4. Protect health care and humanitarian work. End attacks on and interference with hospitals, ambulances and relief teams. Return seized medical and humanitarian assets, including the eight UN vehicles and the equipment removed from 2 December Hospital. Allow fuel, oxygen and medical supplies through and the operation of water facilities, and ensure aid is distributed according to need without discrimination.

5. Stop attacks on families, homes and property. End arbitrary raids, looting, the demolition of homes, pressure on people over their relatives, and coercing residents to hand over their homes for military use. Return seized property, including confiscated communications equipment; respect places of worship and freedom of belief; and stop imposing political or religious positions by force.

6. End child recruitment and the exploitation of vulnerable groups. Stop recruiting and using anyone under 18 and release them immediately, with protection, family reunification and rehabilitation overseen by child protection agencies. Stop forcing migrants, refugees, marginalized people and civilian workers into training or combat and exploiting their economic need to recruit them.

7. Remove the danger of mines and explosive devices. Stop placing them on civilian routes and in areas that endanger residents, hand over available information and maps of their locations, allow specialist clearance teams access, and ensure warning and protective measures until sites are cleared.

8. Allow recovery of the dead. Agree safe arrangements and local pauses in fighting for specialist teams; exchange information on the dead and the location of remains and graves; facilitate identification and return of remains to families; and prohibit mutilation or use of

bodies for extortion or propaganda.

Accountability measures

9. Allow independent monitoring and preserve evidence. Give human rights monitors, journalists and humanitarian teams safe access to affected areas, and stop intimidating victims, witnesses and their families. Preserve operational orders, detention and recruitment records and relevant communications, and make them available to competent investigative bodies.

10. Stop shielding those responsible. Cooperate with independent investigations to identify perpetrators, those who gave orders and commanders with effective control. Where there is serious evidence, remove suspects from positions in which they could repeat violations or interfere with witnesses and evidence, while guaranteeing a fair trial.

To the Government of Yemen and judicial and local authorities

11. Open independent and effective criminal investigations into the killings, detentions, looting, recruitment and attacks on facilities and supplies documented here. Examine the chain of command and the responsibility of Houthi superiors, prosecute those against whom there is sufficient evidence, protect victims and witnesses, and ensure due process.

12. Provide urgent services and protection. Ensure medical referral, hospital fuel, water, food and shelter for those affected; support education for children, displaced families and people with disabilities; and secure transport and supply routes in coordination with humanitarian agencies, respecting civilians' safety and freedom of movement. Ensure that any closure of crossings for security reasons is necessary and proportionate and allows the passage of patients and civilians.

13. Guarantee reparation and protect the rights of displaced people. Provide legal assistance and document losses and property rights; establish a fair and transparent mechanism for compensation, restitution and rehabilitation; facilitate voluntary, safe and dignified return; and protect displaced people's homes and land from seizure and unlawful disposal.

To the United Nations, influential states and donors

14. Establish or support an independent international accountability mechanism with the mandate and resources to monitor violations, collect and preserve evidence and identify those responsible, including Houthi leaders. Ensure the protection of its sources and the cooperation of the parties, and publish regular reports on the protection situation.

15. Impose targeted individual sanctions, through due legal process, on those against whom there is evidence of responsibility for violations or for obstructing relief, with humanitarian exemptions that do not impede food, medicine, services or civilian remittances.

16. Activate national and international justice. Support judicial cooperation and the prosecution of people suspected of war crimes before competent courts, including under universal jurisdiction where its conditions are met. Call on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Yemen to the International Criminal Court.

17. Fund response, protection and recovery. Fund health, water, shelter, education, child protection and psychosocial services, as well as mine clearance and the recovery and identification of the dead. Prioritize besieged areas and hard-to-reach communities and ensure aid is delivered according to need.

Any settlement must uphold victims' rights to truth, justice and reparation, exclude people suspected of war crimes from amnesties that would block investigation and prosecution, and include guarantees that the violations will end and not recur.

Annex B. Sources

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